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Abstract: 
In a recent Dutch euthanasia case, a woman underwent euthanasia on the basis of an advance 
directive, having first been sedated without her knowledge and then restrained by members of 
her family while the euthanasia was administered. This article considers some implications of 
the criminal court’s acquittal of the doctor who performed the euthanasia. Supporters of 
advance euthanasia directives have welcomed the judgement as providing a clarification of the 
law, especially with regard to the admissibility of contextual evidence in interpreting advance 
euthanasia directives, but suggested that the law regarding advance euthanasia directives 
should be further relaxed to remove the requirement of current suffering, and that an 
unfortunate consequence of the prosecution is that it is likely to deter doctors from performing 
euthanasia even in more straightforward cases. This article argues that the court’s endorsement 
of the use of contextual evidence is problematic, that the case for prioritising prior decisions 
over current interests has not been advanced by the discussion surrounding this case, and that 
worries about the alleged deterrent effect are not well-founded. 
 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
In a recent Dutch euthanasia case, a woman referred to as Mrs A underwent euthanasia on the 
basis of an advance directive, having first been sedated without her knowledge and then 
restrained by members of her family while the euthanasia was administered.[1] This article 
examines the implications of the Dutch criminal court’s acquittal of the doctor who performed 
the euthanasia in this case 
Even before reaching the criminal court, this case generated considerable discussion. Earlier 
commentaries identified concerns relating to specific facts of the case. These included: a lack 
of clarity in the woman’s advance euthanasia directive (AED) regarding the circumstances in 
which she intended euthanasia to be performed, and in particular a suggestion that she wished 
to determine the time of death herself; doubts about the woman’s competence at the time her 
AED was written; uncertainty about whether she was suffering intolerably (as Dutch law 
requires) at the time the euthanasia was carried out; and the doctor’s use of covert sedation in 
the face of spoken and physical indications that the patient may not have wished for euthanasia 
at the time it was carried out.[1–4] The commentaries also relate these concerns to more general 
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arguments about the moral legitimacy of AEDs given the limits of a person’s insight into their 
uncertain future circumstances and the changes that can occur in their personality and 
preferences between the writing of a directive and its execution. 
Two of these specific concerns were upheld in the pre-criminal investigations of the case. 
Under Dutch law, all cases of euthanasia must be reported to the relevant Regional Review 
Committee. In this case, the committee held that the wording of the AED was insufficiently 
clear to constitute a valid request, and that the patient (who was restrained by her family after 
sitting up during the procedure, despite having been sedated) may have been resisting 
euthanasia. The medical disciplinary tribunal to which the case was subsequently referred 
similarly found that the AED was ambiguous, and that the doctor performing the euthanasia 
should have attempted to discuss her intention with the patient rather than sedating her.[5]  In 
short, the criticisms were that the AED lacked clarity and that the no-longer-competent patient 
did not assent to its execution. 
In contrast with the committee and the tribunal, the criminal court acquitted the doctor of 
wrongdoing, holding that the alleged lack of clarity in the AED was insufficient to undermine 
its validity given contextual evidence used by the doctor to inform its interpretation, and that 
oral confirmation of the patient’s desire for euthanasia at the time it was carried out was neither 
possible, given her advanced dementia, nor required by law.[5]  
A court decision does not, of course, settle either philosophical or empirical disputes beyond 
determining the law’s attitude to them. In this instance there is room for critics of AEDs to 
argue that Dutch law rests on mistaken philosophical assumptions or that the court was 
mistaken in its assessment of how compliance with the relevant principles was or was not 
demonstrated by the facts of the case. Regarding the latter, it may be pointed out that that some 
of the facts asserted in the Regional Review Committee’s report (for example, that subsequent 
to updating her AED Mrs A had said that she was “not yet” ready for euthanasia, and had 
described the euthanasia or assisted suicide procedure as “going too far”[1]) do not appear to 
have been addressed in the criminal court’s judgment.i However, my aim here is not to assess 
the court’s interpretation of the facts but to examine some of the case’s most important actual 
or claimed implications.  
 
i At least, these facts do not appear in Asscher and van de Vathorst’s account of the case, on which I am relying. 
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In so doing, I will have particular regard to the claims made by Asscher and van de Vathorst: 
first, that the verdict is a confirmation and clarification of the law permitting AEDs, especially 
with regard to the admissibility of contextual evidence in interpreting them (which Asscher and 
van de Vathorst view as a positive development); second, that there is a case for further 
relaxation of the criteria for carrying out euthanasia based on an advance directive, by removing 
the requirement of current suffering; and third, a worry about doctors being deterred from 
carrying out euthanasia, “even for other, far less controversial cases”. I will argue that Asscher 
and van de Vathorst establish neither the desirability of admitting contextual evidence nor that 
the case is likely to have an undesirable deterrent effect, and that their account of the case does 
not advance the case for prioritising prior wishes over current interests. 
CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION 
According to Asscher and van de Vathorst, the court’s ruling that an AED that lacks clarity 
may be interpreted “contextually”, taking account of conversations between patient and doctor 
at the time the AED was written, “helps to overcome one of the intrinsic difficulties of drafting 
an AED, namely to be clear enough for the performance of euthanasia, and not too restrictive.”  
The difficulty to which this points is a familiar tension between specificity and inclusiveness: 
an advance directive (whether relating to euthanasia or some other intervention) needs to 
specify the action that it authorises or refuses, and the circumstances in which it does so, 
narrowly enough that it isn’t mistakenly taken to justify decisions that the patient would not 
have endorsed, but broadly enough that it is not invalidated by factors that the patient would 
have considered irrelevant. It is not clear, however, that the lack of clarity alleged in Mrs A’s 
AED was of this nature: rather, the question asked by critics of the decision to execute the AED 
was whether it was intended as an advance directive at all, or whether, given its references to 
dying “when I think the time is right” and “at my request”, it was merely expressing the desire 
to be offered the opportunity to request euthanasia while still having capacity.  
Either way, the suggestion that conversations between patients and doctors can provide clarity 
that is not possible in a written AED does not stand up to scrutiny. If oral statements made by 
a patient in the course of such conversations can clarify their intentions, then it is not clear why 
they could not be incorporated into a better-drafted version of the AED. It may be that the 
conversations of the type that Mrs A’s doctors reported to the court can help to elicit details 
about the patient’s preferences that are likely to be missing from a statement composed in the 
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absence of such conversations. This only means, however, that what I shall call a naïve 
statement supplemented by evidence from conversations with the doctor is likely to be a better 
reflection of the patient’s intentions than the naïve statement alone. It does not entail that the 
combination of naïve statement and contextual evidence is better than a clear and detailed 
written statement drawn up following such conversation and with the help of someone with 
appropriate expertise and experience. Given the risks involved in a doctor or a court relying on 
remembered conversations (which may not be remembered correctly, or at all), there is at least 
a pro tanto reason for preferring the statement produced with expert help to the naïve statement 
interpreted in the light of the doctor’s recollections. If it is objected the court need not rely on 
the doctor’s memory as the doctor will have made a record of their conversation, then this 
concedes that the clarifications elicited conversationally can be captured in written form.  
Asscher and van de Vathorst also write that the criminal court’s verdict means that an “AED 
does not need to have the (legal) clarity” that was sought by the lower tribunals (the Regional 
Review Committee and the disciplinary tribunal), and that “not everyone needs to consult a 
lawyer to write an AED.”  But whether this is an advantage for the patient will depend on the 
balancing of benefits and risks.  
On the positive side, not having to employ a lawyer is likely to save expense and might mean 
that more patients (who want to) are able to draw up AEDs. However, it is an exaggeration to 
suggest that if the court had not allowed contextual evidence this would mean that only an AED 
drawn up in consultation with a lawyer could be valid. A patient would still be free to formulate 
their own AED, although they would run the risk of it not being acted on if deemed 
insufficiently clear. A patient who employs a lawyer in these circumstances is paying to 
(hopefully) reduce that risk. Allowing contextual evidence to be used also reduces the risk of 
an AED not being acted on, without the expense of a lawyer. However, it does not remove that 
risk altogether, since there is no guarantee that the recollections of doctors or others will be 
sufficient to resolve the meaning of an unclear AED to the satisfaction of the courts. So, a 
patient wanting to be sure that their AED is acted on would be well-advised to consult a lawyer 
(or other relevant expert) anyway.  
Moreover, allowing contextual evidence introduces its own risks for the patient, since a 
doctor’s recollections may be inaccurate. Another doctor or a court relying on them may draw 
mistaken conclusions about the patient’s intentions. There is therefore a possibility that 
euthanasia is carried out in circumstances where the patient would not have intended it, or that 
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it is not carried out where the patient would have intended it. So, again, a patient seeking to 
reduce the risk of their wishes not being carried out would be well-advised to seek expert help 
in drawing up their AED in a way that captures the details that would otherwise be vulnerable 
to the vagaries of a doctor’s interpretation and memory. Allowing family recollections as 
contextual evidence introduces still more risk of mistaken interpretation, due to the conflicts of 
interests to which family members may be subject. 
None of this is to say that doctors should not be permitted to use contextual evidence in 
interpreting an AED, or that the courts should not take it into account in judging the legality of 
a doctor’s actions. If an AED is open to different interpretations and the patient no longer has 
the capacity to clarify it, then it may be better to consider contextual evidence than to ignore it. 
But there is also good reason to be cautious about such evidence and for patients writing an 
AED to consider (and to be encouraged to consider) seeking expert help. Whether or not 
allowing contextual evidence is good policy will depend on the balance of benefits and risks, 
and at the policy level the relevant risks will include the possibility that by allowing poorly-
drafted AEDs to be salvaged, the permitting of contextual evidence will disincentivise good 
drafting and the use of expert help. 
PERSONAL IDENTITY 
Another key ethical issue concerning AEDs, as mentioned above, is the change in a patient that 
can occur between the writing of an AED and the occurrence of the circumstances that will 
trigger its execution. Asscher and van de Vathorst write:  
The core question here is whether one should follow the wishes of the then-self as put down in the AED 
or follow the apparent interests of the person with dementia. Some claim the now-self is a new person, 
based on the huge changes in psychological identity, and that this new and vulnerable person should be 
protected even from his former wishes. … Alternatively, it can be argued that the opposition between the 
now-self versus the then-self is a false dichotomy. If one accepts the person with dementia as the same 
person as before, because the person is the same character in one ongoing life story with one narrative 
identity, it is not implausible to take account of the wishes expressed before. 
There are, as this passage acknowledges, two issues here. First, there is a question of identity: 
whether a person whom dementia has left with few memories and changed personality, 
preferences and values is the same person as the former occupant of their body. If the answer 
to that is “no”, then Asscher and van de Vathorst’s description of a person being “protected 
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from his former wishes” does not literally make sense, since it will be a different person’s 
wishes that may determine the fate of the person with dementia. As Buchanan puts it, advance 
directives in these circumstances will not be “vehicles for self-determination”, but “sinister 
devices to subjugate other persons.”[6] Only if personal identity is preserved does the second 
question – how to balance a patient’s current interests and wishes against the wishes they 
expressed when they had full capacity – even arise.ii  
The question of whether personal identity is preserved in situations where AEDs are used is 
both philosophical (concerning the criteria for personal identity) and empirical (concerning the 
extent to which psychological connections are retained or lost). Asscher and van de Vathorst 
do not engage with the substance of these arguments but they do contend that, in acquitting the 
doctor in the case of Mrs A, the court has settled the position of the law on this matter: 
The verdict affirms that for the law the now-self and the then-self are the same person, otherwise AEDs 
or any other advance directive could never be valid. 
This, however, is too general a conclusion to draw from a single case. The fact that the court 
found Mrs A’s AED to be valid shows only that in the eyes of the law a person can retain their 
identity after losing the capacity to make end of life decisions, not that they necessarily do. 
Whether there may be other cases, involving more severe cognitive decline, in which personal 
identity is lost, is not determined by the verdict in this one case. In fact, a stronger conclusion 
concerning the preservation of personal identity can be inferred from the Dutch euthanasia 
statute independently of this case, since the statute (Termination of Life on Request and 
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, 2002, section 2(2)) explicitly gives legal force to 
advance directives without any qualifications as to the narrative or psychological continuity 
needed to underpin it.[7] The criminal court’s judgement therefore does not alter the law’s 
position on the question of the personal identity of patients with dementia. 
CURRENT INTERESTS VS PRIOR WISHES 
If we grant that in a case like that of Mrs A, sufficient psychological continuity exits to maintain 
personal identity, then the question arises of how to balance the wishes previously expressed 
 
ii For brevity I set aside the scenario in which individual undergoing euthanasia is not only not the same person as 
the one who wrote the AED but not a person at all. Buchanan’s view is that acting on an AED may be justified in 
such a case, but I would contend that his argument for this mistakenly equates a human non-person with a mere 
object. 
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in an AED against the patient’s current interests. Some commentators have seen this case as 
vindicating previous concerns that AEDs might lead to patients being killed against what 
appear to be their current wishes or interests on the basis of their prior decisions.[1]  
Asscher and van de Vathorst believe such concerns to be misplaced, for two reasons. First, they 
argue that under Dutch law, “[i]n order for a physician to perform, euthanasia, he or she must 
be convinced that the patient in question is suffering unbearably and hopelessly at the time of 
the euthanasia” and that “no-one had doubts about the suffering in this case.”  
Whether Mrs A’s suffering was “unbearable” might be questioned given her previously quoted 
comments that she was “not yet” ready for euthanasia and considered it to be “going too far” 
and the view of one of the doctors who assessed her that she was at times (especially during 
her husband’s visits) cheerful.[1,8] However, for Asscher and van de Vathorst this should not 
matter ethically, since for them “the (apparent) experiential interests of a person should not 
over-rule the existential interests laid down in an AED.” Thus, even if Mrs A had been like 
“Margo”, the subject of Dworkin’s partly fictionalised case of a woman with severe dementia 
who is carefree and cheerful in her current, albeit limited, condition, they would hold that it 
was right to carry out euthanasia according to her previously-stated wishes.[9] 
For Dworkin, the prior wishes reflecting the patient’s autonomous deliberation should be 
respected because they represent “critical interests”, which shape, and give meaning and 
coherence, to our lives in a way that mere “experiential interests” do not. Asscher and van de 
Vathorst use the language of critical versus experiential interests but do nothing to address 
criticism of Dworkin’s position, which has argued that this distinction is less clear and less 
important to many people’s conception of their own good than Dworkin supposes.[10] They 
argue, in what seems a remarkably weak justification for ending someone’s life contrary to 
what appear to be their current wishes, that because the (experiential) interests of a person with 
advanced dementia can only be inferred from observation, it is “impossible to exclude that it 
might still be in the person’s interests to no longer exist”. They write that because a person 
with severe dementia is no longer able to reflect on his interests and weigh them himself, this 
should have happened when they still had the capability:  
During the drawing up of an AED the person would have (or should have) considered that he might be 
an apparently happy person with advanced dementia, and still considered this not to be the end of his 
narrative that he wanted. 
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This echoes Dworkin’s focus on narratives and endings, but the parenthetical phrase indicates 
that we cannot rely on an AED being based on such an overarching perspective (again 
indicating the importance of clarity and advantages of an AED being composed with expert 
guidance), and ignores plausible doubts about the extent to which someone who has not yet 
experienced the impact of severe dementia can reflect authoritatively on the quality of life of a 
person like Margo. 
The case for allowing an AED to override the current interests or wishes of a person with 
dementia is therefore not advanced either by the court’s judgment, which accepted (whether 
rightly or not) that Mrs A’s current interests aligned with her previously-stated wishes, or by 
Asscher and van de Vathorst’s analysis.  
DETERRING DOCTORS 
A final issue to consider is whether, notwithstanding its outcome, the prosecution may deter 
other doctors from performing euthanasia, making it harder for patients to access assistance in 
dying. It is not clear whether Asscher and van de Vathorst raise this issue merely as an 
observation or whether it is intended to have normative implications (for example for future 
decisions about whether to prosecute). Either way, the evidence for this being a serious concern 
is weak.  
As Asscher and van de Vathorst state, this is the first prosecution of a doctor for euthanasia 
since it was legalised in 2002. It is, moreover, a case that clearly pushes at the boundaries of 
the legal criteria for lawful euthanasia, as illustrated by the findings of the Regional Review 
Committee and the medical tribunal, and by Asscher and van de Vathorst’s own view that the 
case clarified the law with respect to the use of contextual evidence. Nevertheless, the court 
found in favour of the doctor. Given all this, it seems unlikely that doctors practicing euthanasia 
in cases that fall clearly within the legal parameters need worry about prosecution. 
The only concrete evidence that Asscher and van de Vathorst offer for a deterrent effect is that 
the prosecution resulted in the Dutch Centre for Euthanasia Expertise receiving more requests 
for advice, including advice concerning straightforward cases. However, if doctors are 
uncertain about the application of the legal criteria then it is surely a good thing that they obtain 
advice, and where the advice is that the case is legally unproblematic it is hard to see how they 
will be deterred. 
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CONCLUSION 
The most important implication of this case concerns the court’s approval of the use of 
contextual evidence in interpreting AEDs. This is a significant development of the law, but, I 
have argued, one which brings risks as well as benefits, at both individual and policy levels. 
The problem it addresses would be addressed more reliably and with less risk by encouraging 
patients to obtain expert advice when drawing up AEDs. This development therefore should 
not be given an unqualified welcome, but should be regarded with great caution. 
The court’s confirmation of the legal status of AEDs and its implication that personal identity 
can survive a loss of mental capacity are unsurprising given the explicit role for AEDs specified 
in the Dutch euthanasia statute. 
Due to Mrs A’s reported comments and the use of sedation and restraint, the case raises the 
moral question of how the current interest of a non-competent patient should be weighed 
against the wishes that they expressed when they had capacity, as discussed in commentaries 
published prior to the criminal court hearing. Asscher and van de Vathorst use the criminal 
court judgment as an occasion to state their support for a Dworkinian policy that would, 
contrary to the current law, allow euthanasia on the basis of an AED even where this would go 
against what appear to be the current wishes or interests of the individual. However, neither 
their discussion nor the court’s verdict adds substantially to existing debate about this 
controversial view. 
Finally, there is not sufficient evidence to support the suggestion that this prosecution will deter 
doctors from performing euthanasia or to suggest that the prosecution should not have been 
brought. 
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